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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Beryl Bray appeals from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Marriott Hotel Corporation.  
Bray filed suit in the district court for the District of New 
Jersey alleging race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e to 2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1994) and the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 I. 
 Bray, an African-American female, was hired as a room 
attendant at the New York Marquis Marriott in 1985.  App. at 99a. 
 Within eight months, she was promoted to Assistant Housekeeping 
Manager, and, two years later, she was promoted to Housekeeping 
Manager at the Park Ridge Marriott in New Jersey.  App. at 100a-
02a.  In early 1993, Park Ridge initiated a "posting" for the 
position of Director of Services.  "Posting" is the process by 
which employees within Marriott who are qualified for an 
available position within the company make known their desire to 
be considered for that position.  Any associate who satisfies the 
minimum requirements for the job has the opportunity to have his 
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or her name submitted or "posted" for the available position.  An 
associate cannot post for a job if he or she is not qualified for 
that position.   
 Bray posted for the position of Director of Services which 
had been vacated by her former supervisor, Richard Lesser.  App. 
at 109a-10a.  Between seven and nine other candidates also posted 
for that position.  App. at 225a.  In his deposition, Leo Nemetz, 
the General Manager at the Park Ridge Marriott Hotel, explained 
that he conferred with George Joosten, the Director of 
Operations, and Robert Steussy, the Director of Human Resources, 
as to the qualifications of the various candidates.1  App. at 
227a-28a.   
 Nemetz testified that he initially ranked the candidates by 
their PAF scores,2 but all of the criteria set forth in 
Marriott's Center Management System Career Planning Guidelines 
Policy for the Career Planning Process ("MCMS") were considered 
in deciding which one candidate would be interviewed.  The MCMS 
sets forth the following considerations to be employed in ranking 
candidates for a position: 
EXPERIENCE 
*Compare each candidates relevant work experience both pre- 
                     
     
1
  Although several different spellings of "Joosten" and 
"Steussy" appear throughout the record, we rely on those used in 
the district court's opinion except when quoting text where a 
different spelling is used. 
     
2
  Marriott formally evaluates its employees and assigns 
them a "PAF" score on a sliding scale of "1" to "4" with "1" 
being the highest.  See app. at 137a, 224a.   
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and post-Marriott. 
*What experience level does the position require? 
 
PAF RATING 
*Does one candidate have a higher PAF rating than another? 
*Evaluate the candidate's MDA [Management Development 
Assessment] or SDA [Supervisor Development 
Assessment] (if available) along with the 
skill requirements of the position.   
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
*Does the position require extensive or specialized training 
(e.g., culinary, revenue management, 
information systems)? 
*Does the candidate have the necessary training and 
education? 
 
RELOCATION 
*Cost of Relocation for each candidate in relation to budget 
*Input of Regional Team or senior management, i.e., Regional 
or Senior Vice President if house move is 
involved. 
 
SALARY 
*Comparison of candidate's salary in relation to the 
hotel's, staff department or support 
operation's budget. 
*Importance of position salary budget vs. candidate's 
salary. 
 
App. at 43a.  Nemetz further stated in his deposition that all 
three individuals who participated in the meeting unanimously 
agreed that Therese Riehle, who is White and had been working at 
a different Marriott hotel, would be interviewed as the top 
candidate.  App. at 231a-32a.  Riehle was hired effective April 
10, 1993.  App. at 50a.  According to Nemetz, the principal 
reason for promoting Riehle was that she had the highest PAF 
rating, app. at 230a, 235a, but he insisted that all of the 
factors in the MCMS were considered.  
 Riehle had begun working for Marriott in May 1988 as a co-op 
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student.  App. at 69a.  In 1989, she accepted a position as an 
Assistant Housekeeping Manager at the New York Marquis Marriott  
and, in 1991, she became the Assistant Director of Services 
there.  App. at 74a.  Riehle's Associate Profile3 reflects that 
she possessed an occupational grade level of 45 (indicating she 
supervised managers), had a degree in Restaurant and Hotel 
Management, app. at 68a, and had received two "Manager of the 
Month" awards while at the Marquis, app. at 76a-77a.  Riehle was 
interviewed for the promotion, and, during that interview, Nemetz 
learned that she had experience overseeing renovations (called 
"re-dos") which the Park Ridge was soon scheduled to undergo.  
App. at 236a.  Riehle had also attended over forty training 
sessions.4  App. at 52a-53a. 
   Bray had PAF ratings of "2" in each of the three years 
reported in her Associate Profile (1990, 1991, and 1992).  App. 
at 54a.  Since Bray was at a smaller hotel than Riehle, Bray only 
supervised associates and accordingly she was assigned a lower 
occupational grade level than Riehle, "43."  App. at 55a.  Bray 
had attended thirteen training sessions over her eight-year 
period with Marriott, and her college degree was in English and 
                     
     
3
  Personnel evaluations and other information relating to 
an employee's job performance and background are maintained in 
the employee's Associate Profile.   
     
4
  The seminars included the following subjects: stress 
management skills, drugs in the workplace, responding to 
emergencies, counseling skills, career planning, leadership 
skills, and discipline skills.   
  
 
 6 
History.  App. at 54a, 56a.   
 Bray did not receive the promotion.  Instead, Riehle was 
offered the position.  Bray claimed that she had been denied the 
promotion to Director of Services because she was Black and then 
filed this suit against Marriott under Title VII.  Following 
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment against 
Bray and in favor of Marriott, and this appeal followed. 
 Discussion 
 II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
the final order of the district court, which exercised 
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and supplemental 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).   
 On review of a district court's grant of summary judgment, 
we apply the same test the district court should have applied 
initially.  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when the admissible evidence fails to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  When the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion 
at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary 
judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is 
insufficient to carry that burden.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  The nonmoving party creates a genuine 
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issue of material fact if he or she provides sufficient evidence 
to allow a reasonable jury to find for him or her at trial.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  In 
reviewing the record, the court must give the nonmoving party the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 727; 
Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1413 (3d Cir. 
1991).       
III. 
 In a case of failure to promote under Title VII, the 
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of unlawful discrimination.  Thus, the plaintiff must 
establish that he or she  
(1)belongs to a protected category; 
(2)applied for and was qualified for a job in an available 
position; 
(3)was rejected; 
(4)and, after the rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applications from 
persons of plaintiff's qualifications for the 
position. 
   
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).5   
 If the plaintiff fulfills these elements, the burden of 
production then shifts to the defendant to "'articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
                     
     
5
  Here, the position did not remain open after Bray was 
rejected.  Rather, the position was filled when Riehle was chosen 
over Bray.  However, this variance from the letter of the 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. formula is not relevant to our analysis. 
 "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the 
specification . . . of the prima facie proof required . . . is 
not necessarily applicable in every respect to different factual 
situations."  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.   
  
 
 8 
rejection.'"  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802); see also 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 
1996)(en banc). 
 The employer must then come forth with evidence, which, if 
taken as true, demonstrates that there was a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the decision not to promote the plaintiff.  See id. at 
1066.  This reason need not be proven to be the reason the 
plaintiff failed to receive the promotion because the burden of 
proving the actual discrimination lies at all times with the 
plaintiff.  If the employer satisfies its burden of production, 
then the plaintiff must produce evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could conclude either that the defendant's proffered 
justifications are not worthy of credence or that the true reason 
for the employer's act was discrimination.  The plaintiff must: 
 
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 
"unworthy of credence" and hence infer "that the 
employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons." 
 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citation omitted).  Otherwise, the 
employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 An inference of pretext may arise if the plaintiff can raise 
suspicions with respect to the defendant's credibility or the 
employer's treatment of the employee.  Josey v. John R. 
Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1993).  The 
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inference, along with the components of the plaintiff's prima 
facie case, allow a jury to conclude that the employer was 
actually motivated by illegal bias, but it does not compel that 
result. See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67.  Moreover, the 
plaintiff cannot prevail under Title VII merely by establishing 
that the employer made a decision that was wrong or mistaken.  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.   
 "Summary judgment is precluded if a disputed fact exists 
which might affect the outcome of the suit under the controlling 
substantive law.  A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine 
'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.'"  Josey, 996 F.2d at 637 
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986))(emphasis added). 
 A. 
 The district court ruled that Bray had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination, and Marriott does not appeal that 
ruling.  Marriott offered evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason 
for its selection of Riehle to rebut the presumption of 
discrimination created by Bray's prima facie case.  Marriott 
asserted that Riehle was the best applicant for the position and 
pointed to a host of factors to support its contention.  Riehle 
had a higher PAF score, and, although Bray had been at Marriott 
longer, it contended that Riehle’s experience was superior as 
reflected by her higher occupational grade level (45 as compared 
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to Bray's 43) and her supervision of five managers.  Marriott 
also noted that Riehle's prior experience with renovations was an 
added reason for preferring her to Bray because renovations were 
due to begin at the Park Ridge.  That experience, however, is of 
limited assistance to our analysis because Nemetz testified that 
Riehle's experience with re-dos did not factor into the rankings. 
 Dist. Ct. Op. at 19.  Moreover, there is evidence that suggests 
that Marriott did not learn of this experience until Riehle's 
interview, and Bray contends that the discrimination occurred 
when Marriott decided to deny her the promotion and interview 
Riehle.  See Appellant Br. at 19-20.  Marriott also pointed to 
the fact that Riehle had attended far more seminars and training 
sessions than Bray to support its contention that Riehle was the 
better candidate.  
 B. 
 We begin by focusing on the dispute over whether Bray was 
ever interviewed for the promotion and Nemetz's testimony 
regarding her qualifications for that promotion.  In doing so, 
however, we stress that it is the totality of the evidence that 
must guide our analysis rather than the strength of each 
individual argument.  The dissent carefully explains each of the 
discrepancies in this record in isolation and concludes that none 
of them creates a material issue of fact. See Dissenting Op. at 
8-11.  We have previously noted that such an analysis is improper 
in a discrimination case: 
A play cannot be understood on the basis of 
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some of its scenes but only on its entire 
performance, and similarly, a discrimination 
analysis must concentrate not on individual 
incidents, but on the overall scenario. 
 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Thus, we must determine whether the totality of the 
evidence would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that 
Bray has established the alleged bias.   
 The issue of Bray's interview was hotly contested before the 
district court, but Marriott conceded this issue for purposes of 
its legal argument on summary judgment.  Given that concession, 
the district court assumed that George Joosten, the Director of 
Operations, did afford Bray a luncheon interview for the 
promotion.  The dispute over that interview is, however, 
significant to our analysis and worthy of discussion.   
 Marriott's MCMS sets forth the procedure and criteria for 
promotions within Marriott.  In addition to outlining the 
criteria by which applicants for promotions are screened, it 
states that initially only one candidate should be interviewed.  
Upon conclusion of screening the candidates, 
only one may be chosen to interview in person 
with the hiring manager.  This is determined 
by using all available information as 
augmented by the screening process to re-rank 
the candidates.  After the in-person 
interview, the hiring manager must decide 
whether to hire that candidate before 
conducting subsequent interviews. 
 
App. at 44a.  
 Bray insists that, during her interview, Joosten told her 
she was the leading candidate and that her first decision after 
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she was officially promoted would be hiring a new housekeeping 
manager to fill the vacancy that her promotion would create.  See 
app. at 328a.  Leo Nemetz, the General Manager of the Park Ridge 
Hotel, testified in his deposition that Joosten told him there 
had been no interview and that Bray's lunch with Joosten was 
nothing more than an opportunity for Joosten to become acquainted 
with Bray.  App. at 233a-34a.  Richard Lesser, Bray's supervisor, 
stated in his affidavit: "I have been advised that there is a 
question as to whether or not George Jooston set up an interview 
with Beryl Bray for the position of director of services.  This 
interview was set up in my presence."  App. at 325a.  We must 
take as fact that Bray was interviewed for the promotion.  Under 
Marriott's policy, this would mean that she was then considered 
the number one candidate for the position.  Therefore, before 
Marriott could conduct subsequent interviews of other candidates, 
it had to decide whether to promote Bray.  But Bray did not learn 
that she had been denied the position until after Joosten told 
her that Therese Riehle had been interviewed and offered the 
position of Director of Services.  App. at 131a.  Yet, Nemetz 
testified that no candidates were interviewed until after they 
had been ranked, that they were ranked first by their PAF scores, 
and that only Riehle was interviewed because she was the top 
candidate for the position under that ranking.  App. at 228a-31a. 
 It is possible that Joosten interviewed Bray outside the 
formal decision-making process and that the result of that 
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interview (or even the fact of it) was never shared with Nemetz 
or others responsible for selecting Lesser's successor.  It is 
also possible that Bray's interview was not favorable and that 
Riehle was then interviewed based upon her PAF scores and 
experience.  However, there is no testimony to support either 
conjecture, and, even if there were, it would be up to a jury to 
reconcile the conflicting testimony surrounding Bray's interview 
and the ranking of candidates.   
 The dispute over Bray's ranking is particularly relevant to 
our Title VII analysis because of Nemetz's discredited belief 
that Bray was not even qualified for the promotion.  The 
following exchange occurred during Nemetz's deposition:  
Q: Did you think that Beryl Bray was 
qualified to be the director of services at 
the Park Ridge Marriott? 
 
A: I can't answer that question because I 
just didn't go into anything other than use 
the - - - the ranking. 
  
Q: I’m not asking if you thought --- Therese 
Riehle was the best. . . .  I'm asking you if 
you thought Beryl Bray was qualified to be 
the director of services . . . . 
 
A: No, I didn't. 
 
Q: Can you tell me why not? 
 
A: I thought she was an excellent employee 
who was a maintainer.  If I thought she was 
capable of doing the job, I may have given it 
to her.  But I was looking for the best 
qualified candidate. 
 
App. at 262a-63a (emphasis added).  A factfinder should determine 
why Nemetz felt that Bray was not qualified or "capable of doing 
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the job."  Since she established a prima facie case under Title 
VII, the factfinder could conclude that Nemetz's erroneous view 
of her ability was the result of illegal bias.  See Sheridan v. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 
1996)(en banc)(the factfinder can conclude from a rejection of an 
employer's proffered explanation and a plaintiff's prima facie 
case that bias was the actual reason a Title VII plaintiff was 
not promoted).   
 Nemetz then retreated from his position that Bray was not 
"capable of doing the job," and his attorney reminded him that 
Bray could not have posted for the position had she not been 
qualified. 
Q: So it was your opinion that Beryl Bray was 
not qualified to be director of services . . 
. ? 
 
A: No, it was not my --- 
 
. . . . 
 
A: I should --- she was not --- let me think. 
 I used the ranking.  I used the ranking of -
-- 
 
[Interruption by Counsel for Marriott]: I'll 
just object to the question because of 
Marriott’s policy that you can’t even post 
unless you’re qualified for the position.  
 
App. at 263a.  The dissent chooses to interpret this as merely 
Nemetz's inarticulate statement that he was seeking the "best" 
candidate, and that Bray, though qualified, was not the "best 
qualified" candidate.  See Dissenting Op. at 10.  A factfinder 
may well agree with that interpretation, but that is not for us 
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to decide.   
 Further doubt is cast upon the selection process by Nemetz's 
testimony that Riehle was unanimously selected the number one 
candidate.  App. at 232a.  He later explained that Joosten had 
not given any input. 
[Joosten] sat in the room with us.  When we said --- I 
did ask.  No one said anything.  No one had 
any disapprovals so I said to Bob Stucey, 
let's go ahead and set her up and George said 
I prefer staying out of this. 
App. at 259a (emphasis added).  After Riehle was hired, Joosten 
told Bray: 
You are both equally qualified.  You had the 
experience.  She had the rating of a one.  
And since you were -- since you had been 
there for a while we thought it wouldn't be 
an incentive for you. 
App. at 130a-31a. 
 "An employer can act only through individual supervisors and 
employees; discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a 
formal vote of a corporation's board of directors."  Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986).  
The distinct method of proof in employment 
discrimination cases, relying on presumptions 
and shifting burdens of articulation and 
production, arose out of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that direct evidence of an 
employer’s motivation will often be 
unavailable or difficult to acquire. 
 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1071.  Therefore, "[a] plaintiff is not 
required to produce evidence which necessarily leads to the 
conclusion 'that the employer did not act for nondiscriminatory 
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reasons.'"  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995).   
 A reasonable jury could conclude from Nemetz's concededly 
inaccurate assessment of Bray that the decision to reject her and 
interview Riehle was driven by racial bias and not by the 
explanations offered by Marriott.  See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 
1067-68 ("[T]he elements of the prima facie case and disbelief of 
the defendant's proffered reasons are the threshold findings, 
beyond which the jury is permitted, but not required, to draw an 
inference leading it to conclude that there was intentional 
discrimination.").  A reasonable jury could also conclude that 
Nemetz’s apparent belief that Bray was "more of a maintainer" was 
based upon racial bias.  See id.  
 If Nemetz's assessment of Bray was racially biased, his 
interpretation of the purportedly objective criteria he relied 
upon to hire Riehle would not insulate Marriott's employment 
decision from that taint.  See, e.g., Hampton v. Borough of 
Tinton Falls Police Dep't, 98 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 
1996)(reversing summary judgment in favor of employer where 
"district court either ignored several discrepancies in the 
evaluation process, or failed to give all reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom [to the plaintiff]").  Although Steussy and 
Joosten were also involved in the hiring process, it is apparent 
on this record that Nemetz was the key decisionmaker.  He was in 
charge of the Park Ridge Marriott, and both Joosten and Steussy 
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reported to him.  See app. at 200a, 258a.  Furthermore, although 
there is conflicting testimony as to the role Joosten played, it 
appears that he refrained from direct participation in the 
decision to promote Riehle because he had a prior connection to 
the hotel where she previously worked.  Appellee Br. at 24; app. 
at 258a-59a.  Therefore, it is particularly relevant to our 
decision whether there are discrepancies in how Nemetz evaluated 
the criteria he purportedly relied upon to rank the applicants 
and select Riehle.  And we conclude that there were. 
 The dissent argues, however, that none of the evidentiary 
discrepancies would allow a reasonable jury to doubt Marriott's 
proffered explanation that it was looking for "the best" 
candidate and that, therefore, Bray cannot prevail under Fuentes 
or Sheridan.  Dissenting Op. at 10.  We do not believe that Title 
VII analysis is so tightly constricted.  This statute must not be 
applied in a manner that ignores the sad reality that racial 
animus can all too easily warp an individual's perspective to the 
point that he or she never considers the member of a protected 
class the "best" candidate regardless of that person's 
credentials.  The dissent's position would immunize an employer 
from the reach of Title VII if the employer's belief that it had 
selected the "best" candidate, was the result of conscious racial 
bias.  Thus, the issue here, is not merely whether Marriott was 
seeking the "best" candidate but whether a reasonable factfinder 
could conclude that Bray was not deemed the best because she is 
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Black.  Indeed, Title VII would be eviscerated if our analysis 
were to halt where the dissent suggests. 
 With this as our starting point, we examine the reasons that 
Marriott proffered to justify its promotion of Riehle over Bray.  
 1.  PAF ratings  
 Nemetz testified that each applicant's PAF scores played a 
major role in determining who was the top candidate.  Similarly, 
the district court concluded that the decision to promote Riehle 
was based in large part upon the PAF scores in each applicant's 
job profile and that these objective scores were a 
nondiscriminatory explanation for why Riehle was picked over 
Bray.  Riehle had PAF scores of "1", "1", and "2" for each of her 
prior evaluations.  All three of Bray's most recent scores, on 
the other hand, were "2s."  Nemetz was aware that Riehle's most 
recent PAF was "1", but he was unable to recall at deposition the 
two earlier evaluations.  App. at 231a.  However, the record 
raises an issue of fact as to the timing of Riehle's most recent 
rating.   
 Although Riehle's first two evaluations were a year apart 
(11/16/91 and 11/14/92), her most recent evaluation -- the one 
that Nemetz recalled -- was only six months after the previous 
evaluation.6  On the other hand, all of Bray's evaluations were 
                     
     
6
  The district court emphasized the fact that "Ms. Riehle 
had received the top performance evaluation for her work with 
Marriott during the previous two years, receiving a '1' for her 
PAF rating."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 13 (emphasis added).  However, 
when this Court reviewed the record, as we must in reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, it became clear that one of the "1s" 
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approximately one year apart (9/22/90, 9/18/91, and 9/21/92).  At 
oral argument, Marriott's counsel was asked why Riehle received a 
"semi-annual" evaluation in what appeared to be an annual review 
process when all of her prior evaluations and Bray's evaluations 
had been annual.  He could offer no explanation.  A factfinder 
should determine if Riehle was given an evaluation out of the 
normal sequence and, if so, why.     
 This record suggests that Riehle officially began as 
Director of Services on April 10, 1993,7 the same date that she 
was given an evaluation of "1" for that position.  Since Riehle's 
PAF was updated in June 1993, it is conceivable that the rating 
of "1" was given at that time to reflect her performance in her 
new position.  However, that is not consistent with Nemetz's 
testimony.  Nemetz was deposed in November of 1994 and testified 
that Riehle was then due for an evaluation but that she had not 
yet been evaluated.8  Absent further explanation, a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Riehle was evaluated out of normal 
                                                                  
had been awarded during a semi-annual review.  At oral argument, 
we asked counsel to explain why Riehle had been given a semi-
annual review but he could not. 
     
7
  The record does not establish when Bray or Riehle was 
interviewed.  However, Riehle's Associate Profile, as updated on 
June 15, 1993, states that her position is Director of Services, 
and her "Date in Pos:" is 4/10/93.  The form also notes her 
weekly salary and states that the effective date of that rate is 
"4/10/93."   
     
8
  This is consistent with an annual evaluation occurring in 
November as Riehle's two other evaluations (excluding the April 
evaluation) also occurred during the month of November. 
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sequence in order to bolster her selection after Bray had been 
interviewed.  See, e.g., Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls 
Police Dep't, 98 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1996) (where Board's 
policy of considering the past three years' evaluations allowed 
it to consider three evaluations of the White candidate who had 
received annual evaluations but six evaluations of the Black 
candidate who was evaluated semiannually, a factfinder must 
determine whether application of that policy was due to racial 
bias). 
 The district court noted that  
Ms. Riehle had received the top performance 
evaluation for her work with Marriott during 
the previous two years, receiving a "1" for 
her PAF rating.  Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, had never received a rating above "2" 
during the previous three years.  Thus, the 
most objective criteria clearly pointed to 
Ms. Riehle as the superior candidate. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-14.  However, this record only reveals two 
scores prior to the time Riehle was interviewed.  One was a "1," 
but the other was a "2."9  Therefore, on half of the two most 
recent evaluations prior to her promotion, Riehle did not do as 
well as she could have.  On the other hand, there is evidence 
that Bray's former supervisor, Richard Lesser, never gave 
anything higher than a "2" so that Bray received the highest 
                     
     
9
  Nemetz testified that the profile that was updated in 
June of 1993 (the one referred to by the district court) was not 
the one he relied upon in ranking Riehle, and the one that he 
said he relied upon was not produced at his deposition.  App. at 
238a.  This record does not establish what Riehle's three prior 
PAF ratings before her promotion were.  
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possible grade for each of the three evaluations in her 
employment profile.  Lesser stated in his affidavit: "During my 
tenure as director of services, I had never given a PAF rating 
higher than a two to any manager that I was responsible to 
review."  App. at 325a.  The district court correctly noted that 
Lesser did not state that Bray would have received a "1" but for 
this policy and that Marriott was entitled to rely upon Riehle’s 
higher score even if Bray's lower score resulted only from 
Lesser’s individual grading practice.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-14 
n.13.  However, that does not answer whether Nemetz's failure to 
recognize that Bray had received the highest grade available was 
the result of a biased belief that she was not qualified rather 
than an objective evaluation of the PAF scores of both 
candidates.  The district court also noted that Bray produced no 
evidence that anyone involved in the promotion knew that Lesser 
never awarded "1s."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-14 n.13.  Furthermore, 
Nemetz disputed whether Lesser ever gave a "1" and testified that 
he thought he recalled Lesser telling him that he had given a "1" 
to an employee on an evaluation.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-14 n.13.  
Although there is a dispute about whether Lesser ever gave a "1," 
there is no dispute that he thought Bray should have been 
promoted.  Lesser testified that he told Joosten that Bray was 
qualified for the promotion:  "In my opinion, which I let known 
to Mr. Jooston and which Mr. Jooston was aware of, Beryl was more 
than qualified to take over my position as director of services 
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at the Park Ridge Marriott.  To this day, I cannot understand why 
she was not offered the position."  App. at 325a-26a.  We 
realize, of course, that Lesser never saw Riehle's application 
and may have thought her better qualified than Bray had he done 
so.  However, that is not the point.  There are enough disputed 
facts on this record concerning Bray’s qualifications, the 
accuracy of Riehle's PAF scores, and Nemetz's view of Bray's 
ability to allow Bray to survive summary judgment. 
 2.  Experience 
 Bray argues that experience is the most important factor in 
promoting within Marriott and points to the fact that it is first 
among the criteria on the MCMS.10  Marriott argues that 
experience is one of many factors to be considered and that there 
is no particular order to the criteria that are evaluated.  The 
parties also argue about which applicant had the superior 
experience and how different types of experience should be 
valued.  The district court agreed with Marriott that Riehle's 
experience was superior to Bray's.  The court noted 
although Mr. Nemetz did not testify as to 
these subjects . . . this court notes that 
Ms. Riehle's educational background included 
a degree in Restaurant Hotel Management, . . 
. while plaintiff’s college degree 
encompassed the fields of English and 
History. . . .  Further, . . . Ms. Riehle was 
twice awarded a "Manager of the Month" award 
. . . while plaintiff has pointed to no 
analogous awards. 
                     
     
10
  The MCMS requires managers to "[c]ompare each candidates 
(sic) relevant work experience both pre- and post-Marriott."  
App. at 43a.   
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Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 n.8.  However, if management did not consider 
these factors in evaluating the experience of the two candidates, 
the factors should not have been considered by the district 
court.  The issue is not whether the court can find a legitimate 
reason why Marriott could have promoted Riehle but whether 
Marriott had a legitimate reason that was not the result of 
racial animus.  "[T]he judge's function is not to weigh the 
evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to 
determine if there is a genuine issue for trial.  The district 
court cannot decide issues of fact at the summary judgment 
stage."  Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 
(3d Cir. 1993)(citation omitted). 
 Nemetz testified that, in ranking candidates, the first 
thing he looks at "is the latest rating that they received at 
their hotel."  App. at 215a.  When asked whether placing primacy 
on the PAF rating is a policy of Marriott, Nemetz acknowledged 
that it was "[n]ot a policy of anybody's.  It's just if you're 
going to go for the best candidate, generally you do that by 
looking at a rating."  App. at 215a.  Bray, on the other hand, 
contends that "[i]t was common knowledge at the Marriott that 
experience was the number one criteria in deciding promotions."  
App. at 329a.  While her belief alone is insufficient to raise an 
issue of material fact, see Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 766 
(3d Cir. 1994)(the "not so" approach "does not create a material 
issue of fact"), it takes on added significance when combined 
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with that fact that "[experience] is the first criteria listed in 
the pamphlet provided for by the defendant, MCMS."  App. at 329a-
30a.  The MCMS lists in the following order factors that should 
be considered in ranking candidates for a promotion: experience, 
PAF rating, training and education, relocation, and salary.  
Marriott suggests that this list is not in order of importance 
because it is preceded by the statement "The following are 
additional considerations to help rank the order of candidates." 
 See Appellee Br. at 30; app. at 43a.  Marriott may be correct.  
However, the order does suggest a certain priority.  For example, 
it is implausible that Marriott intended relocation and salary 
considerations to outweigh or be given equal consideration with 
such factors as experience and the PAF rating.  Thus, "Salary" 
and "Relocation" are listed last.  Moreover, in the MCMS, this 
list of additional considerations is immediately preceded by the 
requirements of posting, the primary of which appears to be 
experience: 
Any associate who meets or exceeds the following 
minimum requirements for a job showing on the 
Job Availability Report will have the 
opportunity to have their name submitted 
(posted) should they wish to apply for the 
job: 
 
   a.Associate has spent at least 
18 months in current 
position (Operations 
Supervisors and Managers 
only), 
 
      OR  
 
   b.Promotion eligibility date 
in MCMS indicates the 
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associate is ready for 
promotion prior to 18 
months in position, 
 
      AND 
 
   c.Associate has a 1 or 2 on 
last PAF rating. . . . 
 
      AND 
 
   d.Associate satisfies the 
minimum objective 
requirements for the 
position applied for as 
noted on the job profile 
in the Career Planning 
Profile Guide, and the 
applied for position is 
listed as one of the 
"possible next qualified 
positions" in the 
associate's MCMS profile. 
App. at 42a.  A jury should determine whether there is any 
significance to the order of the factors in the MCMS, and, if so, 
whether Nemetz's failure to use that order was racially 
motivated.  According to Joosten, Bray was more experienced than 
Riehle: "You are both equally qualified.  You had the experience. 
 She had the rating of a one."  App. at 130a.  In fact, Joosten 
suggested that Bray's experience might have hurt her: "And since 
you were -- since you had been there for a while we thought it 
wouldn't be an incentive for you."  App. at 130a-31a.  A jury 
certainly could conclude that improper racial animus caused 
Marriott to look unfavorably upon Bray's experience.  
 Bray also argues that Marriott violated its own policy in 
failing to give priority to her prior experience at the Park 
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Ridge in order to justify going outside that hotel to promote 
Riehle.  Marriott counters by stating that Bray incorrectly 
states that its policy is to give priority in promotion decisions 
to applicants at the subject hotel.  Marriott points to a letter 
from the Vice President of Human Resources for Marriott dated May 
31, 1991.  That letter states: "Keep in mind that there may be a 
number of qualified candidates for any one position and that, 
before searching outside of their region, hiring managers will 
try to fill open positions first from within their own hotel or 
region."  App. at 296a (emphasis added). 
  Nevertheless, Richard Lesser stated unequivocally in his 
affidavit that "[i]t was common knowledge that one of the 
policies at Marriott was to promote from within the subject hotel 
if at all possible."  App. at 326a.  Marriott's contention is 
corroborated by Nemetz who testified that no preference was given 
to an applicant in the same hotel and that this distinction is 
not even a factor in promotional decisions.    
Q: Is it a factor in making the decision as to who to 
promote, the fact that one individual is in 
the same hotel and one is not?   
 
A: No.   
 
Q: It's not even a factor?  
 
A: No.   
App. at 222a.   
 If Lesser is telling the truth, applicants from within were 
given priority in promotions at the Park Ridge despite Marriott's 
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policy to the contrary.  Given Nemetz's view of Bray, a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that managers at the Park 
Ridge stopped giving preference to candidates already at that 
hotel only when she was competing with a candidate from another 
Marriott in the same region.  Of course, a factfinder could 
certainly conclude that Lesser was simply mistaken about the 
hiring policy at the Park Ridge Marriott, but that is not for us 
to decide.  If a factfinder were to conclude that the policy 
prior to Bray's application was consistent with what Lesser 
thought was "common knowledge," Bray's interview takes on 
increased significance.  It would further establish that her 
experience had been evaluated in a manner that made her the top-
ranked candidate for the promotion.  It would also be consistent 
with Bray’s testimony that she was led to believe during the 
interview that Marriott considered her the top candidate, and she 
was advised that her first decision would be to hire a 
housekeeping manager.  App. at 328a.  
 3.  Occupational Grade Levels 
 The district court noted that the occupational grade levels 
of 45 and 43 for Riehle and Bray respectively meant that "Ms. 
Riehle had attained the position of Assistant Director of 
Services at the New York Marquis Marriott while plaintiff had 
only risen to the level of Housekeeping Manager at the Park Ridge 
Marriott."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (emphasis added).  The court 
repeatedly notes that Bray had "only" attained the level of 
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Housekeeping Manager at the Park Ridge while Riehle had earned 
the title of Assistant Director of Services at the New York 
Marquis Marriott.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 14, 15, 18.  However, 
Nemetz testified in his deposition that there was no difference 
in these job classifications.  "It is based on the size of the 
hotel" with bigger hotels calling the position "Assistant 
Director of Services" and smaller hotels calling it "Housekeeping 
Manager."  App. at 239a.  Nemetz even conceded that Bray could 
not have held a higher position than the one she had without the 
promotion she was seeking as that was the only position above 
Housekeeping Manager at her hotel.  
 Marriott is certainly entitled to give Riehle's job title 
greater weight than Bray's even if the only difference in titles 
is the size of the hotels where they were working.  However, 
Marriott may not do so if racial bias colored how her grade level 
would be valued.  We do not say that this is what happened here 
only that sufficient issues of fact exist to preclude the entry 
of summary judgment.  We do not doubt that a reasonable 
factfinder could accept all of Marriott’s explanations and 
conclude that Riehle was promoted over Bray simply because Riehle 
was the superior candidate based upon all of the criteria 
Marriott says it used to make the decision.  However, this record 
does not compel that result as a matter of law.   
The significance of such evidence is for a jury's 
determination, not a court's.  Had these 
discrepancies been presented to a jury, it 
may have found defendants' explanations quite 
credible, and returned a verdict in their 
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favor.  However, that is not the test that we 
employ, nor is it the test the district court 
should have employed.  Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of plaintiffs, as we 
must, it is clear that they were entitled to 
have a jury decide whether or not the reasons 
proffered . . . were real or pretextual. 
Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep't, 98 F.3d at, 115. 
Thus, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment.    
  IV. 
 The allocation of the burden of proof and the role of 
plaintiff’s prima facie case as first set forth in Fuentes and 
more recently reaffirmed in Sheridan is equally applicable to a 
NJLAD claim.  Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 
A.2d 1139 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995).  Romano applies the 
Fuentes standard of review at summary judgment for Title VII 
cases to NJLAD claims.  Id. at 1143-44.  Thus, our discussion of 
Bray's Title VII claim also applies to her NJLAD claim, and, for 
the reasons provided above, we find that Bray's NJLAD claim 
should have survived summary judgment as well. 
 V. 
 For the above reasons, we will reverse the grant of summary 
judgment to Marriott on Bray's Title VII and NJLAD claims and 
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  In granting summary judgment for defendant, 
the district court also dismissed Bray's related state law 
claims.  Upon remand, the court will once again consider these 
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claims.   
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we laid 
out the evidentiary requirements a plaintiff has to satisfy in 
order to survive a motion for summary judgment in a “pretext” 
employment discrimination case under Title VII.  We held that 
where the employer has proffered a legitimate reason for its 
employment action, the plaintiff must submit evidence that 
either: 
(1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate 
reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder 
could reasonably conclude that each reason was a 
fabrication; or 
 
(2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause of the adverse employment action. 
 
Id. at 762 (emphasis added).  In Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996), petition for 
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3571 (Feb 03, 1997) (No. 96-1231), the 
en banc court reaffirmed Fuentes.  I dissent here because I do 
not see the plaintiff, Beryl Bray, as having met the Fuentes 
evidentiary burden for showing pretext. 
 In the district court, Bray argued that she was entitled to 
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survive Marriott’s summary judgment motion because she had 
satisfied both prongs of the two-prong Fuentes test.  On prong 
one, which involves discrediting the employer’s proffered 
legitimate reasons for the employment decision, Bray’s argument 
was that she “exceeded Ms. Riehle [her competitor, who was 
promoted instead] in every objective test that could be employed 
to evaluate the two candidates and that the only criteria under 
which Ms. Riehle exceeded plaintiff involved subjective inquiries 
which are simply not credible.”  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 17-18).  On 
prong two, which requires plaintiff to show that racial 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment decision, Bray 
pointed to a document setting forth the minority hiring goals of 
the Park Ridge Marriott, and alleged that the failure to meet 
these goals made it “more probable than not that racial 
discrimination was a motivating or determinative factor in her 
rejection for the position of Director of Services.”  (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 21).  The district court found Bray’s arguments 
insufficient on both prongs and granted the Marriott’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
 As I read Bray’s brief on appeal, she is challenging the 
district court’s determination on prong one.  She says she has 
“pointed to enough weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherences or contradictions in the employer[’]s proffered 
legitimate reasons to overcome summary judgment regarding 
plaintiff’s Title VII claim.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 2).  
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Marriott’s proffered legitimate reason for why it promoted 
Therese Riehle over Bray was that Riehle was better qualified.  
Bray counters with the assertion that the evidence shows that her 
qualifications were so much better than those of Riehle that 
“there is no reasonable explanation as to why Riehle was given 
the position over Beryl Bray other than using race as a 
consideration.”11  (Appellant’s Br. at 6).  
 What kind of evidence does prong one require?  The prong one 
requirement is that plaintiff has to point to “evidence, either 
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
reasonably . . . disbelieve the employer’s articulated reasons.” 
 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  Fuentes explains that: 
To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the 
plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s reason 
was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at 
issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the 
employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, 
prudent, or competent.  Rather, the non-moving 
plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in 
the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its 
                     
     
11Bray’s ultimate burden at trial will be to demonstrate 
that intentional racial animus was the reason for her non-
promotion -- in effect, a requirement that she demonstrate prong 
two of the Fuentes test.  See Henry L. Chambers, Getting it 
Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment 
Paradigm, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1996).  However, at the summary 
judgment stage Bray needs only to demonstrate her prima facie 
case and prong one.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.   
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action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence. 
 
Id. at 765 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 Fuentes tells us that the burden on a plaintiff who chooses 
to proceed under prong one is a “difficult” one.  Id. at 765.  
That the burden under prong one is “difficult” makes sense 
because plaintiff is attempting to indirectly produce an 
inference of intentional discrimination out of the fact that the 
employer’s proffered reason was untrue.  Hence, where, as is the 
case here, the defendant asserts that it made the choice among 
candidates that it did because it wanted the “best qualified” 
candidate, plaintiff would have to point to evidence that showed 
either (1) that the defendant’s selection process and criteria 
were filled with such inconsistencies that the employer’s claim 
that it was seeking the “best qualified” candidate was a sham or 
(2) that the qualifications of the person actually promoted were 
so much lower than those of her competitors that a reasonable 
factfinder could disbelieve the claim that the employer was 
honestly seeking the best qualified candidate. 
 It is crucial to understand that prong one is not satisfied 
if plaintiff merely points to evidence that shows that her 
qualifications were roughly comparable to those of her 
competitors.  Nor is prong one satisfied by evidence that the 
employer is not “fair” or “kind” as a general matter.  Prong one 
requires that plaintiff point to evidence from which a reasonable 
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factfinder can “disbelieve the employer’s articulated reasons.”  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis added).  “Disbelieve” is a 
higher standard than “disagree.”  It is not enough for the 
evidence to be such that a reasonable factfinder could disagree 
with the employer as to which candidate was better qualified.  
Instead, the evidence must be such that a reasonable factfinder 
can infer that the employer was not truly looking for the best 
qualified candidate, i.e., that the employer’s articulated 
legitimate reason was pretextual.  The burden on a plaintiff 
seeking to proceed on prong one is difficult, but as Fuentes 
explains, “‘[i]t arises from an inherent tension between the goal 
of all discrimination law and our society’s commitment to free 
decisionmaking by the private sector in economic affairs.’”  32 
F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 
983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 
(1993)).  
 Moving back to the case at hand, Bray’s burden under prong 
one was to show either that there were so many inconsistencies in 
the criteria and procedures that Marriott used in its selection 
process that a reasonable factfinder could infer that the process 
was a sham and was not aimed at finding the best qualified 
candidate, or that Bray herself was so much better qualified than 
Riehle for the job in question that a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Marriott did not, in fact, honestly believe that 
Riehle was better qualified than Bray.  I dissent because the 
majority has not come close to holding Bray to her burden under 
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prong one and has thereby impermissibly diluted Fuentes’ prong 
one requirements for crossing summary judgment. 
 The majority here, after articulating the prong one test 
from Fuentes, goes on to cite Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth 
Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1993), for the proposition 
that “[a]n inference of pretext may arise if the plaintiff can 
raise suspicions with respect to the defendant’s credibility or 
the employer’s treatment of the employee.”  Maj. Op. at 8 
(emphasis added).  Relying upon this statement derived from 
Josey, the majority identifies evidence from which a factfinder 
could conclude that Marriott may have treated Bray unfairly in 
not following the proper internal firm processes in rejecting 
her.  I acknowledge that this evidence does literally satisfy the 
statement that “[a]n inference of pretext may arise if the 
plaintiff can raise suspicions with respect the defendant’s 
credibility or the employer’s treatment of the employee.”  Maj. 
Op. at 8 (citing Josey, 996 F.3d at 638-39) (emphasis on a term 
added by majority).  But that statement has to be read in 
context.  The relevant context is that the evidence of 
“suspicion” has to be such that it could allow a reasonable 
factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered reason for 
the non-promotion was a lie.  That the plaintiff has been able to 
identify evidence showing that the employer did not follow the 
proper internal procedures, or that the employer was not 
completely truthful in its depositions, should not by itself 
enable the plaintiff to cross the summary judgment hurdle if the 
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identified evidence would not enable a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the employer’s proffered reason for denying the 
promotion was false.  In other words, so long as Bray is 
proceeding on prong one, she is required to point to evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Marriott did 
not honestly believe that Riehle was better qualified than Bray. 
 To me, the evidence in this case shows two things -- (1) 
that the qualifications of Bray and Riehle for the Director of 
Services position they were seeking were roughly equal and (2) 
that Marriott may have treated Bray unfairly by not following its 
own internal procedures as to giving her proper notice that she 
had been rejected and failing to give her a proper explanation 
for her rejection.  If we had a case where the only evidence was 
that the competing employees had qualifications that were roughly 
similar and the job in question was a service-sector managerial 
position, such as the one here, the case would be easy.  In such 
service-sector managerial jobs the qualifications of the 
candidates are often no more than loosely correlated with the 
position to which the candidates are seeking promotion, and the 
qualifications being weighed tend to include subjective internal 
evaluations of the candidates as important components of the 
final determination.  In such a case, unless the qualifications 
of the candidates are extremely disproportionate, it is hard to 
see how a district court could deny summary judgment to an 
employer who claims that it, in its business judgment, thought 
one candidate was better qualified than the other.  Cf. Ezold, 
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983 F.2d at 527 (cautioning against “‘unwarranted invasion or 
intrusion’ into matters involving professional judgments about an 
employee’s qualifications for promotion”). 
 The majority’s claim, however, is that there is more than 
merely evidence as to the candidates’ qualifications that shows 
them to be roughly equal.  The claim is that there is evidence of 
such inconsistencies and discrepancies in the selection process 
that it would allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve 
Marriott’s claim that it promoted Riehle because it thought her 
to be best qualified.  I will list that evidence and attempt to 
show why it does not bring into question Marriott’s claim that it 
promoted Riehle because it thought she was better qualified than 
Bray. 
 First, Marriott had a procedure for in-house promotions 
whereby, upon conclusion of a screening of the candidates, only 
one person could be chosen for a personal interview with the 
hiring manager.  Maj. Op. at 11.  After this interview, the 
hiring manager had to decide whether to hire the candidate before 
conducting further interviews.  Maj. Op. at 11.  Bray claims, and 
we take that claim as fact, that she was interviewed for the 
Director of Services position first.  Maj. Op. at 12.  Therefore, 
before Marriott could conduct subsequent interviews, its internal 
procedures required it to reject Bray first.  Maj. Op. at 12.  
However, Bray did not learn that she had been turned down for the 
position until after Riehle had been interviewed and offered the 
job.  Maj. Op. at 12. 
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 This evidence does not show any more than the fact that 
Marriott did not comply with its internal rules by failing to 
inform Bray that she had been rejected before interviewing and 
hiring another candidate.  The majority, however, sees this 
evidence as combining with other evidence from depositions to 
warrant reversal of the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Marriott. 
 The second piece of evidence identified by the majority is 
that Leo Nemetz, the General Manager at the Park Ridge Marriott, 
testified at his deposition, with respect to Bray, that: 
I thought she was an excellent employee who was a 
maintainer.  If I thought she was capable of doing the 
job, I may have given it to her.  But I was looking for 
the best qualified candidate.  
 
Maj. Op. at 13 (emphasis added by majority).  The majority 
latches on to the statement of Nemetz that he did not think Bray 
“capable of doing the job,” and claims that the statement was so 
clearly erroneous that a factfinder could have concluded that 
there was illegal bias in the selection process.  Maj. Op. at 13. 
 I utterly fail to see this.  As a literal matter Nemetz appears 
to have been in error in suggesting that Bray was not “capable of 
doing the job.”  But in his very next statement, he qualified 
what he had said about Bray by explaining: “[b]ut I was looking 
for the best qualified candidate.”  Maj. Op. at 13 (emphasis 
added).  This latter statement implies that Nemetz thought that 
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Bray was not the “best” among the candidates, and that that was 
what he meant by stating that Bray was not qualified -- as 
opposed to Nemetz thinking that Bray did not possess the minimal 
qualifications necessary to perform the job.  But the majority 
ignores Nemetz’s explanation that he was looking for the “best 
qualified candidate.”  For me, Nemetz’s explanation makes it 
clear that the former statement, “[i]f I thought she was capable 
of doing the job, I may have given it to her” was no more than 
loose language.  That this was no more than loose language is 
confirmed by the fact that Nemetz, upon being pressed by Bray’s 
counsel as to whether he really meant that Bray did not possess 
the minimal qualifications for the job, withdrew that statement. 
 Maj. Op. at 13-14.  The majority, however, isolates the “[not] 
capable of doing the job” language and concludes that there is 
evidence from which it could be inferred that the employer was 
not truly looking for the “best qualified candidate.” 
 In any event, it does not matter whether Nemetz was in error 
in stating that he thought Bray was not qualified.  The issue is 
whether Marriott was not credible in its proffer that it honestly 
thought Riehle to be the “best qualified” candidate.  I fail to 
see how pointing to loose language in a deposition satisfies this 
burden. 
 The majority then proceeds to identify another piece of 
evidence that it says casts “[f]urther doubt . . . upon the 
selection process.”  Maj. Op. at 14.  This evidence is deposition 
testimony by Nemetz that Riehle had been “unanimously” selected 
  
 
 40 
by a three-member selection committee as the number one 
candidate.  Maj. Op. at 14.  Later, Nemetz modified his position 
to explain that one of the three members, George Joosten, had 
asked to stay out of the decision.12  Maj. Op. at 14.  What would 
this evidence show a reasonable factfinder?  It does not attack 
or bring into doubt any of Riehle’s qualifications.  Instead, all 
it shows is that Nemetz, once again, was loose with his 
characterization of the facts as to the selection process.  
However, unless the evidence goes to undermine Marriott’s 
assertion that it thought Riehle was better qualified and 
promoted her for that reason, Bray should lose at summary 
judgment.13 
                     
     
12There is no evidence that Joosten opposed Riehle’s 
promotion.  In fact, after Riehle was hired, he told Bray: 
 
You are both equally qualified.  You had the experience.  
She had the rating of a one.  And since you were -- 
since you had been there for a while we thought it 
wouldn’t be an incentive for you. 
 
Maj. Op. at 14-15 (emphasis added).  If anything, it appears from 
Joosten’s explanation that he did not find his two colleagues’ 
determination that Riehle was the better qualified candidate 
problematic, even though he thought the two candidates were 
equally qualified. 
     
13In addition, there was testimony from the Park Ridge 
Marriott’s former Director of Services, Richard Lesser, that “it 
was common knowledge that one of the policies at Marriott was to 
promote from within the subject hotel, if at all possible.”  Maj. 
Op. at 25.  Marriott disputes this claim, but even if taken as 
true it would not go to attack Riehle’s qualifications or 
Marriott’s claim that it thought Riehle better qualified.  As 
with the other evidence identified by the majority, this piece 
merely goes to show that Bray was not afforded the proper 
internal process in her rejection.  But anti-discrimination law 
does not attempt to police fairness in employment as a general 
matter, but rather only polices the narrow area of intentional 
discrimination in employment decisions.      
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 I will not test the reader’s patience by describing the 
comparative evidence as to Bray’s and Riehle’s qualifications.  I 
merely reiterate that while the evidence may not show that Riehle 
was clearly the superior candidate, as the district court 
thought, it shows that the candidates were approximately equal in 
qualifications.  Reasonable people could probably differ on their 
thoughts as to which candidate was better qualified, but that is 
not the question.  Instead the question in this prong one 
analysis is whether a reasonable factfinder could determine, 
based on the evidence, that Marriott could not have honestly 
thought that Riehle was better qualified.  Given the subjective 
nature of many of the qualifications being considered and the 
amorphous nature of the question of what qualifications were 
needed to perform the specific job for which promotion was being 
sought, I do not see how a reasonable factfinder could find that 
Marriott did not honestly think Riehle to be better qualified.  
The inconsistencies and discrepancies that Bray identified were 
too minor and the qualifications of the candidates too similar 
for a reasonable factfinder to determine that Marriott was lying 
when it stated that Riehle was selected because Marriott believed 
she was more qualified. 
 There is only one piece of evidence that the majority points 
to that I see as directly attacking Marriott’s claim that it 
thought Riehle was better qualified.  Nemetz testified that 
Riehle’s higher performance ratings (“PAFs”) were a crucial 
factor in Marriott’s thinking that Riehle was better qualified 
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than Bray.  Maj. Op. at 17.  It is undisputed that Riehle’s raw 
PAF scores were higher than those of Bray.  Riehle had two scores 
of “1" and one of “2,” whereas all of Bray’s scores were “2s.”  
But the majority has found evidence in the record that it views 
as showing these scores to be suspicious.  What the majority has 
found is that one of Riehle’s evaluations was a “semi-annual” 
evaluation, as opposed to the normal “annual” evaluation.  Maj. 
Op. at 18.  This, the majority suggests, puts the PAF scores 
under suspicion. 
 I agree that if indeed Riehle was given an additional, 
unscheduled and unexplainable review, it looks like an improper 
bolstering of credentials, and could make it somewhat plausible 
for a factfinder to conclude that Marriott did not think that 
Riehle was, in fact, better qualified.  But I can find no mention 
of this “semi-annual” review, let alone any argument based on it, 
anywhere in Bray’s briefs.14  Nor can I find reference to this 
point in the papers opposing summary judgment that Bray filed in 
the district court.  I believe it is problematic to attach 
importance to inferences that could be drawn from evidence that 
the parties have not had an opportunity to adequately consider 
                     
     
14Issues not raised are waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union 
of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d 
Cir.) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief, and for those purposes `a passing reference to an 
issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.’” (citation omitted) (ellipsis in original)), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 356 (1994); see also Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. 
of Public Welfare v. United States Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, what we are 
talking about here is evidence that was not mentioned, as opposed 
to a legal argument not raised. 
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and explain. 
 We asked Marriott’s counsel about the “semi-annual” review 
at oral argument and he did not have an explanation.  Maj. Op. at 
18 n.6.  But Marriott’s counsel had probably never asked his 
client to explain the “semi-annual” review to him.  My unease 
with attaching too much significance to counsel’s failure to 
explain is further amplified by the fact that Marriott’s counsel 
at trial had passed away in the period between trial and appeal, 
and counsel on appeal was new.    
 In sum, the evidence here shows (1) that the two applicants 
were of roughly equal qualifications with respect to the job for 
which they were seeking promotion and (2) that the employer may 
have acted unfairly in failing to follow proper internal 
procedures in rejecting one of the candidates.  Under existing 
anti-discrimination law, evidence of unfairness in the selection 
process alone, without evidence linking the unfairness to race-
based animus, should not be enough to get a plaintiff beyond 
summary judgment, so long as the employer’s proffered legitimate 
reason for the employment decision remains intact.  I 
respectfully suggest that what the majority here has done is to 
weaken the burden on the plaintiff at the pretext stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to one where all the plaintiff needs 
to do is to point to minor inconsistencies or discrepancies in 
terms of the employer’s failure to follow its own internal 
procedures in order to get to trial.  I have no doubt that in the 
future we are going to get many more cases where an employer is 
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choosing between competing candidates of roughly equal 
qualifications and the candidate who is not hired or promoted 
claims discrimination.  I also have little doubt that most 
plaintiffs will be able to use the discovery process to find 
minor inconsistencies in terms of the employer’s       having 
failed to follow its internal procedures to the letter.  What we 
end up doing then is converting anti-discrimination law into a 
“conditions of employment” law, because we are allowing 
disgruntled employees to impose the costs of trial on employers 
who, although they have not acted with the intent to 
discriminate, may have treated their employees unfairly.  This 
represents an unwarranted extension of the anti-discrimination 
laws.   
 
